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WHY BE MORAL?
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THE MODERN WORLD
There are many difficult problems facing thoughtful people
at the present day-problems of which their fathers and
grandfathers knew nothing. Emotionally
UNREASON
minded
folk often try to solve these modern
~~HE CAUSE
problems
by appealing to the irrational feelOF OUR
ings
that
sometimes
surge up within most of
TROUBLES?
us. Yet, if we think things over calmly, it becomes obvious that what is needed in this twentieth century of
our era is not more unrestrained emotion but more quiet reasonableness. Wars, revolutions, and violent changes are fundamentally irrational processes, and if we want to help in
creating a new world order free from these upheavals we
must cultivate the arts of reason.
The Rationalist Press Association is an organization which
exists for such a purpose. During the forty years of its
existence it has printed and sold more than four million
cheap reprints of the works of the great constructive thinkers,
besides hundreds of thousands of copies of new works on
Science, History, Philosophy, and Biblical Criticism.
The Thinker's Library (Is. 3d. each) is a recent series which
has achieved great popularity. In it are included works by
Aldous Huxley, H. G. Wells, J. B. S. Haldane,
GREAT
Havelock Ellis, John Langdon-Davies, Sir
BOOKS BY
J.
G. Frazer, Lord Morley, Prof. Albert
GREAT
Einstein, and other leading writers. Current
WRITERS
matters of interest are dealt with in the
unofficial monthly organ of the association, the Literary Guide,
and also in the Rationalist Annual, published every October.
The R.P.A. is not, however, satisfied with what it has done.
It believes that only by continual emphasis on the value of
human reason can the world be brought to
MUCH WORK sanity. More than ever, therefore, is it
STILL TO
BE DONE
necessary that all who share this belief should
become members of the Rationalist Press
Association and induce others to do likewise" .If you are in
sympathy with the aims of the R.P.A. and appreciate the work
it has done, and if you are wishful of assisting it to do better
work in the future, you should fill in the Membership Form
on the third page of this cover. . Requests for further information should be addressed to: The Secretary, Rationalist Press
Association Ltd., 5 & 6 Johnson's Court, Fleet St., Lon4on, E.C.4.
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WHY BE MORAL?
MORALS AND MIRACLES

THE nineteenth century witnessed a frontal
attack upon the prevailing forms of supernatural
belief. The success Df this attack was due to a
comparatively new factor, a ' new level of debate
which the Rationalists forced on their opponents.
The novelty was that the issues were no longer
permitted , to be settled from an armchair.
The challenge to theology came direct from the
laboratory.
Earlier Rationalists could appeal, in the
main, only to physics and astronomy. It
must be admitted that their attempts to bring
human life into the picture fell an easy prey to
idealist criticism. They tried to show that man
was an automaton in a vast and complicated
machine. This view was such an outrage on
common sense that it could be maintained only
in the seclusion of a study. The real revolution
in nineteenth-century thought was to bring man
fully into the picture.
3
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That was the great achievement of Darwinism.
The Copernican theory had reduced the world
from its status as centre of the universe to that
of a planet revolving round an unimportant
star. The difficulty of the theologians was to
reconcile this account with the cosmology of the
Bible, which was regarded as being divinely
inspired. Various ingenious solutions were propounded, many in the spirit of the opinion which
held fossils to be the work of Satan in his attempt
to undermine the faith of believers. But the
controversy took on a different tone when man
himself was brought into the scientific scheme.
It was no longer possible to believe that the
world was created in 4004 B.C., for, in addition
to ,the advance of biology, there were archreo. logical discoveries which called for a drastic
revision of the time-scale. There was evidence
of the existence of great civilizations in Egypt
and the Near East which were old-some of
which were forgotten-before the Jews were
heard of. And before any civilization arose it
seemed undeniable that men had roamed over
the earth for hundreds of thousands of years.
This was no guess-work: how else could the
skulls and stone weapons now open to inspection
be explained?
To make matters worse for the defenders of
orthodoxy some of these skulls clearly belonged
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to a different species from homo sapiens. Yet
these near-men made tools, used fire, and buried
their dead with care. Were they, too,
descendants of a primitive couple in the Garden
of Eden? Had they also "souls,~' and were
they tainted with Original Sin?
With the exception of Catholics and Fu~da
mentalists, it is no exaggeration to say that
Christian apologists have been in running retreat
ever since these discoveries were made. The
Fundamentalists are too ignorant to care; the
Catholic Church tried to pretend that nothing
had happened.
(
What was not realized in the flush of success,
however, was that some grave problems were
created for Rationalists as well as for the
orthodox. . If nian is merely an animal, mainly
distinguished from an ape by the possession
of a more developed brain, what becomes of
" moral values" ? If he cannot invoke a supernatg.ral law-giver, how is he to decide what is
right and what is wrong? If he is not a soul
with an immortal destiny, what is he to strive
for? Is there any meaning in saying that
a universe of matter has a moral character, and,
if not, how can there be any ethics? If the
universe is neutral in regard to man, what is to
prevent him from doing exactly as he pleases,
provided he is willing to take the consequences?
Of·-

.........
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Few of the Rationalists who supported
the intellectual attack on nineteenth-century
theology had a satisfactory answer to these
questions. They certainly wanted to get rid of
miracles; but they also wanted to keep morals.
They seemed to think that the supernatural
basis of Christianity could be safely removed,
leaving its principles of conduct intact.
This was a serious confusion of thought, and
led to some curious results.

"HEARTLESS, WITLESS NATURE ,"

T. . H. Huxley vigorously championed
. Darwinism against orthodox theology, and nowadays most people would agree that he had the
better of the contest. But he recoiled from the
inference that moral values were merely part of
the evolutionary scheme. Indeed, he declared
in his famous Romanes lecture that " the
ethical progress of society depends not on
imitating the cosmic process, still less in running
away from it, but in combating it."
The dust has long since settled on the scientific
controversy, but the ethical problem remains.
Nothing illustrates the change in the general
outlook that has come about better than the
contrast between T. H. Huxley and Aldous .
Huxley, ' between grandfather and grandson.
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The dualistic compromise of the former has
given place to the amoral pluralism of the
latter.
So far from combating the cosmic process,
Aldous Huxley has advocated its ' complete
acceptance. The Humanist, he has argued,
should accept the world as he finds it. He
should accept himself, with all his'inconsistencies,
and resist the temptation to be consistent.
ct The
life-worshipper's aim is to achieve a
vital equilibrium, not by drawing in his
diversities (for Exuberance, in the words of
Blake, is Beauty), but by giving them rein one
against the other."
This means that the scientific account must be
admitted. Man is a part of Nature, and ethics
is merely a technique for self-cultivation.
Nothing is intrinsically good or bad. ct Do
what you will, this world's a fiction," to quote
Blake again .
.Mr. Huxley's recent passage to mysticism
and Hollywood may have led him to recant
some of the views expressed in the volume bf
essays, Do What You Will. (It is interesting to
note how an Agnostic irrationalism develops
into religious mysticism.) But the solution he
offered-though it would have shocked the
Victorians-has some value as a measure of the .
swing of the pendulum.
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One cannot argue with a writer who scorns
. consistency. "If men are ever to rise again
from the depths into which they are now
descending," he tells us, it will only be with the
aid of a new religion of life. And, since life is
diverse, the new religion will have to have many
Gods. Many; but since the individual man is
an unity in his various multiplicity, also one.
It will have to be :Qionysian and Panic as well as
Apollonian; Orphic as well as rational; not
only Christian, but Martial and Venerean too;
Phallic as well as Minervan or Jehovistic." One
is reminded of Chesterton's tale of the man who
mixed together all the colours in his paint-box
thinking that they would make white.
Mental chaos of this order must be partly
blamed on the toughness of the problem to
which an answer is sought-the problem of how
to create an ethical standard out of evolving
configurations of matter. In between the two
Huxleys stand giant figures whose heads, if not
broken by the problem, were at least bowed.
The melancholy, the sense of emptiness, which
followed the onslaughts of scientific Rationalism,
are admirably described in Mr. Walter Lippman's
A Preface to Morals. There was a wistful
yearning for lost illusions, th,e -mood of a man
sighing for the vanished security of the nursery
and Father Christmas.
(C

I
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As an example of how intolerable the world
disclosed by science seemed we may take A. ].
Balfour's The Foundations of Belief. Beauty,
Morality-everything seemed gone. "Man, so
far as natural science by itself is able to teach
us, is no longer the final cause of the universe,
the Heaven-descended heir of all ages. His
very existence is an accident, his story a brief
and transitory episode in the life of one of the
meanest of the planets. . . . Man will go down
into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish.
The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure
corner has for a brief space broken the contented
silence of the universe, will be at rest."
Consequently he argued that "if on the
naturalistic hypothesis sentiments associated
with beauty seem like a poor jest played on us
by Nature for no apparent purpose, those that
gather round morality are, so to speak, a
deliberate fraud perpetrated for a well-defined
end. "
He concluded that such an abominable state
of affairs was incredible. He reversed Kant's
argument that the existence of a moral law
proved the existence of God; if there is no lawgiver there can be no moral law, which is
intolerable.
Materialistic mechanism, like the genie released
from the bottle, frightened even its creators.
A2
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Thus a similar note of gloom-with an almost
masochistic relish-may be sometimes detected
in Bertrand Russell. In The Free Man's
Worship, he wrote: "A strange mystery it is
that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the
revolutions of her secular hurryings through the
abysses of space, has brought forth at last a
child, subject still to her power, but gifted with
sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the
capacity of judging all the works of his unI
thinking Mother."
A knowledge of good and evil? Not in any
absolute sense. To such a demand the soul
received only "a dusty answer." The timid
might hope that there was some way out, but
the scientist, in his professional capacity, gave
them scant comfort. The same note was struck
by Tennyson.. '" The stars,' she whispers,
(blindly run.'" (It is as well, perhaps, that
they do.) The universe seemed a fortuitous.
concurrence of atoms; man the catspaw of
chance under the cold indifference of the stars.
This feeling of loss, as though an intellectual
scalpel had cut away most of what made life
worth living, may be described in a phrase
adapted from Galileo as " the rape of Reason."
It is the result of the assaults of Reason on the
picture of the world painted by tra~tion and
common sense.
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THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIENCE

Darwinism, together with higher criticism and
advances in anthropology and ethnology, were
like acids, dissolving the traditional view of man
and the universe. The most destructive agent
of all, however, proved to be the new science of
psychology . . For the first time the human mind
began to be studied with the same impartiality
as the human body. I need only mention
Freud's contribution to illustrate the point.
Whatever may be thought of p'sycho-analysis,
however imperfect it may be, it was a landmark
in the encroachment of science upon every
department of life.
Hitherto discussions about human nature had
been conducted from the armchair. Was human
nature intrinsically bad? Were men incurably
war-like? Was environment a stronger influence than heredity? These questions had
been asked much as metaphysicians of ancient
times debated whether the nature of things was
fire or water or mist. Freud held that the proper
study of mankind was man-and he meant it.
Instead of merely theorizing about Man he
studied live human beings, with an appropriate
scientific technique.
He approached the ethical problem as an
empirical investigator. Why did real human

I2
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beings develop a feeling of moral guilt? Were
there any scientific grounds for believing in a
moral sense? What was this curious phenomenon that men called conscience? One ought
to be able to determine how moral sentiments
arose, just as a physiologist could say how an
appendix was acquired. ,
There is no space to summarize the general
theory of Freudianism here. For our purp~ses
the most interesting part of the theory is that
relating to the formation of conscience. Freud
employed three main concepts in his analysis of
the mind-the id~ the ego, and the super-ego.
The whole organism, he declared, obeyed a
fundamental principle of seeking what was
pleasant and avoiding what was painful.
The primary urges originated in the ide .
Normally we do not see the id in operation, for
unless a man is deranged his uncritical, unthinking longings are checked by deliberation. He
looks before he leaps. The type of behaviour,
therefore, which is marked by some circumspecti,on, learned by experience, is said to arise
from the ego. The ego, therefore, "dethrones
the pleasure-principle, and substitutes for it the
reality-principle, which promises greater security
and greater success."
So the behaviour of a man who is honest
because he believes that hon~sty pays issues from
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the ego. But what of the man who believes that
honesty is right-.to whom stealing appears not
merely foolish but also sinful? To answer, Freud
had to frame a new concept, a differentiation of
the ego, the super-ego. Conscience is the superego.
This is much more than' the substitution of one
name for another. The super-ego develops
during childhood after the formation of the
ffidipus-complex. The boy solves the problem
of his rivalry with the father by identifying himself with the father and thus transferring a
possible source of punishment from without to
within. "Just as the super-ego is the father
become impersonalized, so the" dread .of the
castration which he threatened has been converted into indefinite social anxiety or dread of
conscience." Consequently repression begins
with the formation of the super-ego.
An inner tyrant is formed, a second self as
imperious as Socrates's daimon. It gives rise to
the feeling that certain conduct ought to be done.
The ego corrects the primitive demands of the id
in the interests of self-preservation. The superego imposes an arbitrary pattern of behaviour by
erecting standards of absolute right and wrong.
Not the actual father, but an idealized father,
dominates the scene. What is taken over is the
moral code to which the father is presumed to

14
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adhere-in other words, the super-ego of the
father is transmitted to the son. The clash
between the super-ego and the ego results in
those painful sensations of guilt which repressions
endeavour to ease but may only worsen. "The
super-ego has the ego at its mercy and applies
the most severe moral standards to it; indeed it
represents the whole demands of morality, and
we see all at once that our moral sense of guilt is
the expression of the tension between the ego
and the super-ego."
Freud undoubtedly paid too little attention to
the social determinants of morality, and he has
been justly criticized for restricting his field of
observation to the kind of civilization in which
we now live. Anthropologists, for example,
have denied that the CEdipus-complex is to be
found in all cultures. Nevertheless he did
amazing pioneering work; he cleared much of
the jungle of metaphysical and theological
verbiage that obscured the problem of conscience
and moral sense. He brought the subject down
to earth.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTACK

Equally destructive of traditional ethics is the
approach of the most recent philosophical school,
logical positivism.
This attack is directed
against all metaphysics; and in so far as it can be

WHY BE MORAL?

IS

maintained it cuts the ground from underneath
every system of ethics based on absolute values.
It may be the case, as Prof. C. D. Broad has
said, that men do not merely desire to do a
specific action, they desire to do what they
believe to be right. Freud has endeavoured to
give a scientific explanation of why we are
preoccupied with right. The logical positivists,
however, carry the rape of reason to the uttermost limit. They say that the word" right"
has no meaning.
Consider,-for example, the proposition: "It is
right to destroy Hitlerism." . What does this
mean? I t is a plain fact that some people say it
is right to destroy Hitlerism; it is equally a fact
that some people-Hitler's supporters-say that
such conduct is wrong. How is one to decide
between the two assertions?
According to logical positivism there is no way
of de~iding. The original proposition was not
an assertion about a fact of the universe; it
looked as though it was, but actually it was a .
pseudo-statement. There is
means of v~rify
ing it, and so logically it . is meaningless or
" non-sense."
One of the ·attractions of logical positivism
is the charm of being able to describe your
opponent's statements as nonsense. It has
become increasingly clear, however, that this

no
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vigorous school threw away the baby with the
bath-water. But the movement has had a
healthy, astringent effect in philosophy. I t has
got rid of a lot of useless lumbe~.
With regard to ethics-and we are not now
concerned with the other aspects of logical
positivism-there seems to be a gain in lucidity,
and the l6ss is not so great as some people fear.
To return to our example, all that is necessary
to make a sensible assertion about Hitlerism is to
rewrite the proposition in such a form as: "It is
in our interests to destroy Hitlerism," or " It is
in the interests of civilization . . . etc."
We should then have to define our interests
accurately. We might have to say what we
,mean by civilization. This might be difficult
and the results m"a y even be unexpected. But
at least we should be thinking clearly and
concretely.
"
No doubt a vast amount of muddled thinking
would be avoided if the terms "right" and
" wr~ng " were eliminated from our vocabulary.
But if we continue to use them as shorthand
expressions we must be careful to purge them of
their usual mystical meaning.
If evolution is true, if there is no authority
behind the scenes to which we can appeal, if we
do not believe that any Church or Government
possesses a moral ans'Yer-book, it is of course
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meaningless to say ' that some actions are
eternally right or eternally wrong irrespective of
consequences. We are born into a society with
taboos and limitations on individual freedom;
~hese are not sacrosanct, and, indeed, no progress,
or, to use a more neutral word, change, would
ever have occurred if men had not at times
rebelled against their traditions.
Nothing is really gained by asking when it is
" right" to rebel. We may consider, however,
whether a change is likely to bring the satisfactions that at first sight it seems to promise;
and next we have to ask what is the best method
of bringing a desirable state of affairs about.
The whole discussion is then transferred from
cloudland to the realm of science. There is no
questi<;:>n of what we ought to do; it is only a
question of what we want to do and how best to
do it.
Reason cannot tell us what to wish for: a
wish, however it came into being, is ultimate.
But one function of reason is to select from a
multitude of conflicting wishes just those that are
possible of realization. Reason operates on
experience to find a means of obtaining what we
desire-having made sure that we are not crying
for the moon.

I8
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HUMAN NATURE

In order to act successfully in this difficult
world we must fashion some kind of plan, some
rules to guide us in obtaining the satisfaction of
our wishes. That we seek satisfaction is not a
metaphysical statement; it is just a fact,
impossible to deny.
It may be objected, of course, that without
some absolute standard social life will become an
anarchic interplay of rival egoisms-a chaos in
which each private will seeks only its private
satisfaction. Thus, when Polybius charged the
Epicureans with undermining the religious faith
. of the Roman masses, he argued that the
Philosopher might safely dispense with superstitions, but, if the mass of people were infected
with scepticism, what force was to keep them in
order?
Misgivings of this kind · arise from a too
abstract view of human nature.. lp.deed, a
whole class of objections to a morality based on
the satisfaction of desires is the result of a belief
in defiance of all experience that our desires
are mainly "bad." The doctrine of Original
Sin, and the idea that it is somehow dangerous
to leave people to their own devices, that there
is a continual downward, bestial pull, are
legacies of theology and faulty science.
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What is the truth of the matter? To the
Rationalist this should be an empirical question"
Whether human nature can be changed, and
what are its constant qUalities (if any), can be
discovered by an examination of history,
primitive cultures, and clinical case-books.
There seems to be no doubt whatever that
men behave very differently in different social
environments. If we generalized about human
nature from observations of the Indians of
North-West America we should say that man
was inherently combative and boastful. Having
attended a potlatch and watched the assembled
chiefs rival each other in the destruction of their
property-the honours resting with the chief
who has burned the greatest amount of possessions-we should certainly say, to put it mildly,
that intense individualism was characteristic of
human nature.
On the other hand, if we confined our observations to the Zun.is of California, where property
is communally owned and it is the height of
bad form for any member of the tribe to thrust
himself forward or glorify his own exploits, we
should arrive at a different conclusion. The
heroes of the Homeric Age would not have won
the admiration of Confucius. The manners of
an Australian aborigine are scarcely those of an
English country gentleman.

20
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It is claimed by Malinowski, in Sex and
Repression in Savage Society, that the Trobriand
Islanders do not develop the sort of family
complex that Freud noted among families in
contemporary Europe. "Applying to each
society a somewhat terse, though crude formula,
we might say that in the CEdipus comp~ex there
is the repressed desire to kill the father and
marry the mother" while, in the matrilineal
society of the Trobrianders, the wish is to marry
the sister and to kill the maternal uncle."
Among the Trobrianders any sexual feelings
on the part of a brother to a sister are regarded
with abhorrence. We ourselves may sometimes
feel that it is quite natural to be repelled by
incestuous relations of this kind. Yet the
ancient Egyptians practised brother-sister
marriage for thousands of years. No moral
sense told them that it was wrong; on the
contrary, they would have given strong religious
reasons for believing that it was right.
A usual objection to the abolition of private
property is that sooner or later communal
ownership must break down, "because you
cannot change human nature." Similarly, it is
urged that there have always been wars and
there always will be, because war is also the
result of an unchangeable element in human
nature. But there are not only societies that
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can be observed to-day in which private property is unknown, there is also good reason for
believing that communal ownership of the
essentials of life was universal before the
discovery of agriculture, and that even then it
broke down only gradually. And as for the
statement that" there have always been wars,n
it is simply untrue. Elliot Smith, in his Human
History, has assembled crushing evidence that
many primitive tribes extant to-d~y exhibit
nothing of the pugnacity and fierce com. petitiveness ,that are often assumed to be . the
characteristics of " natural man."
The war of all against each other is shown to
be a myth. The African pygmies are peaceful,
honest, temperate, and monogamous; adultery
is unheard of., The Veddahs of Ceylon are
strictly monogamous, harmless, and truthful;
so are the Sakai of Malaya and the Kubu of
Sumatra. The Eskimoes hold property in
coml!l0n, have no ruling class and no word for
war. Grievances are composed by the offending
man singing a song, and if the audience approves
he is held to have justified hims~lf.
In the light of present knowledge it can be
safely asserted that human nature is not a
. constant but a variable. I t changes with the
shifting social background. Hitherto such
changes · have been, on the whole, blind

22
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accompaniments of the great transformations
in social life. But now that man is becoming
aware of this process a new possibility has arisen
of deliberately controlling it.
" There is not a shadow of doubt that human
nature can be changed," according to Sir
Arthur Keith. But he thinks that so hazardous
an experiment may s.pell the extinction of the
human species. Others think-and surely not
without reason-that unless certain fundamental
changes are made without much delay the
human race can hardly survive. .
· SOCIAL HYGIENE

Do we wish it to 's urvive? This is a somewhat
academic question. Man is endowed with instincts which impel him to preserve both himself and the species. The satisfaction of these
instinctive drives is essential to happiness, so
far as the majority of men are c~ncerned.
Here, then, we seem at last to have a foundation of fact which may serve the moralist as a
starting-point. The fact is that to lead a full
life-to secure the maximum of satisfactionsman must organize and behave in such a way
that his energy is not wasted by frustrating
conflicts. There are two interlocl{ed modes of
activity-the social and the individual. An
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objective ethic requires an understanding of this
dual manifestation.
As things are there does not exist a developed
science that deals with man's double functions.
There are only a number of separate sciences.
So we must turn to history, sociology, and
economics if we are to master those problems
of social surgery which must be solved if society
is to be reorganized. And we must turn at
present to medicine and psychology in the hope
of finding some rules for securing the health
and integration of the individual personality.
An objective, scientific ethic cannot be concerned with what men ought to do, in a religious
or metaphysical sense. All that we can mean
by goodness is, in the widest sense, health-the
healthy functioning of the individual and the
society of which he is a part. A scientific
morality should therefore express the general
principles of social and individual hygiene.
It will not say: "If you do this you will be
damned." It will say instead: "If you do this
you-or society-will not survive. You are
ignoring the known conditions of health and
happiness." It will point to consequences, as a
doct~r might warn a patient against excess.
The fact that some people knowingly drink
themselves to death or refuse to take any notice
of doctors does not ' prevent the growth of
\

>
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medical science. Similarly the fact that some
people may not care whether they and society
survive need not prevent the construction of
rules qf survival.
The laws of Nature cannot be broken. Some
kinds of conduct, some types of organization,
obey laws of decay, others laws of growth.
On the one hand there is the promise of a more
abundant life; on the other there may be death.
NEW VALUES FOR OLD

In common language we say that a man is
happy when he makes the most of himself,
when there is the minimum of internal conflict
and frustration. Spinoza-who divined a great
deal that modern psychology has painstakingly
established-pointed out that pleasure is a sign
of heightened vitality and pain of lowered
vitality~

A sick man cannot engage his activities to
the full. If we are to use the word "virtue,"
a sick man cannot be entirely virtuous according
to a naturalistic system of morals. This may
seem a hard saying to those who have not rid
themselves of religious notions of praise and
blame. To be unvirtuous is not necessarily to
be blameworthy; it is to be unfortunate or
malformed. The Greek term arete comes near
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to this definition of virtue. Arete was the
sharpness and reliability of a sword, the goodness
of a citizen in carrying out his civic duties, the
excellence and proper functioning of a thing.
It would be manifestly untrue to say that a
sick man can never be happy. It may even
be that Epicurus was right and that a philosopher
can be happy on the rack. But few would
recommend the sick-bed or the rack as a means
of obtaining happiness. What is certain is that
happiness accompanies the harmonious functioning of mind and body. This smooth working
of the whole organism should therefore be our
ethical ideal.
We do not know enough to achieve perfection,
but we know a good deal. Medical science can
tell us what to avoid if we wish to keep our
bodies fit, and psychology can point roughly to
the sort of conduct that should be followed if
we wish to make the most of our mental
faculties.
In an objective system of ethics health and
disease are thus the equivalents of right and
wrong. These values are not figments of the
imagination. If we build upon them we shall
build on a hard, durable foundation of fact.
The rape of reason has merely caused us to shed
utopian fancies that weare better without.
Our new standards are not arbitrarily imposed;
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they are derived from an exact observation of
life itself.
The method of the psychologist is not to
inv~nt an ideal type of behaviour out of his head
and demand that it should be conformed to.
He points to obvious cases of breakdown, to
neurotics, morons, and imbeciles. "It is a
matter of observation," he says, "that sicknes~
and collapse of this kind are due to a certain
kind of circumstance and conduct. Quite often
these disastrous results could'have been avoided.
Therefore if you behave in an opposite way you
will not tread this dangerous path." It is
possible to formulate rules which, if acted upon,
will make' it hard for neuroses to take root, so '
long as there is sufficient bodily strength to make
resistance possible.
.
For the moment we must ignore the difficulties that may arise from social circumstances.
Let us take a typical picture of a moron given
in a book by Wood-Jones and Porteus, The
Matrix of the Mind. I have chosen it because
the authors are physiologists and they do not
enter upon the more debatable grounds of
psychology. They are illustrating the fact that
man's evolution has been marked by the growth
of the cortex, or upper brain, at the expense of
the lower brain. "The most striking characteristic of persons who are deficient in cortical
I
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development is their childish behaviour. . ..
There is frequently an extreme suggestibility
in mat ters of belief, an acceptance wIthout
qu~stion of things as they appear to be."
These qualities, then, will constitute badness
in an empirical ethics. Their oppositesmaturity, s~lf-control, the ability to suspend
judgment-will be among the new virtues.
Describing a moron, the authors continue:
" His loud, easily excited laughter, his parrotlike repetition of other people's maxims, his
obtrusive vanity, his foolish suggestibility, never
seem to come before the bar of self-examination.
He is usually self-satisfied, but, while there is
obtuseness to any real indignity, there is an
altogether disproportionate reaction to slight
or fancied injuries/'
We do not want a society of morons. Even if
they were contented, they could scarcely remain so
for long. Such a society could not maintain itself.
Cortical control must therefore be among our
basic values. The cerebral cortex is the organ
of intelligence and deliber~tion; the thalamic
area is the seat of instinct and feeling-tone.
Cortical control means intelligent discrimination
and foresight. It means, in Freudian language,
the domination of the ego over the ide It means
acting according to the reality-principle instead
of the pleasure-principle.
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The child acts according to the pleasureprinciple. The first stage, as Ferenczi rather
picturesquely puts it, is the period of magicalhallucinatory omnipotence. The small infant,
unself-conscious, aware only of fond and continuous attention, has his wishes realized .s imply
by imagining the satisfaction of them-at least,
that is how it seems. This is followed by a stage
in which the child has to scream deliberately and
make signs with his hands in order to get his
wants attended to. Ferenczi calls it the period
of omnipotence by the help of magical gestures.
Still later the situation changes again. "The
outstretched hands must often be drawn back
empty. . . . Till now the all-powerful being has
been able to feel himself one with the world
that obliged him and followed every nod, but
gradually there appears a painful discordance in
his experiences." The child is now aware of an
outside world that does not correspond to his
wishes. He develops a kind of animism, pro, jecting his own qualities on surrounding objects,
talking to his dolls and even scolding t,hem, as
savages address and sometimes beat their idols.
With the ability to talk the child enters upon
the period of magic thoughts a~d magic words,
and in this he may well remain for the rest of
his life.
Most men never quite grow up. The reIns
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of power, in a world faced with. catastrophe at
at every turn, are in· the hands of sick men and
neurotics. These over-grown schoolboys understand neither the process in which they are
. involved nor the forces they are, unfortunately,
able to unleash. Indeed, the burning problem
to~day is . not so much how to increase our
admittedly imperfect knowledge, but how to
use the knowledge we already possess.
The goal of a scientific morality should be to
produce a race of men who are spiritually mature,
whose behaviour is the opposite to that of a
moron or a neurotic, who do not flinch from
difficult tasks, or regress, when met by some
obstacle, to an infantile level.
To build castles in the air, instead of on the
solid earth, to excuse our failures on the plea
that Fate has loaded the dice against us, to
project our hopes and fears on to the external
world-these are the characteristics of the neurotic. We pass through many stages between
birth and death, and to linger unduly at any
one of them, to try to cling to a vanished youth,
to regret the inevitable process of growth and
decay, is a confession of immaturity.
The neurotic is immature. He takes refuge
from a disagreeable reality in a world of makebelieve. Like the drug-addict he attempts a
solution that is no solution. He is vain and
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indifferent alike to the feelings of others and the
claims of the community. Like a child, he seeks
pleasure without responsibility, and he is haunted
by irrational fears. He is deficient in willpower and excessively suggestible. He is a
split personality.
THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH

It is possible, therefore, to draw up a list of
cardinal virtues which are opposites to what
psychologists would regard as vices. They
would be based on two general principles, framed
in accordance with observed consequences of
actions. There is' the principle of truthfulness,
which lies at the root of reality thinking; and
there is the principle of regard for others, which
arises from the fact that neurotic behaviour is
anti-social.
The man who shuts his eyes to a difficulty lies
to himself. in the long run there is a heavy
price to pay for all self-deception. Similarly, a
man who lies to his fellows can seldom hope for
more than a temporary gain. If he becomes
known as a liar no confidence is placed in his
word, and even when he speaks the truth he is
not believed. It is invalid, from the point of
view I am adopting, to say dogmatically that a
lie is " wrong" in all circumstances. Those who
believe in eternal values might hold, with
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Cardinal Newman, that it would be better for
the whole earth to be afflicted with famine,
plague, and wars, better for the heavens to fall,
than for one human soul to be stained by the
guilt of even a venial sin. On the whole Catholic
casuists have taken a more common-sense
attitude; some of them have evaded the difficulty by calling a lie by another name. It is
obvious, however, that an ordered life would be
impossible if people could not be usually trusted
to speak the truth.
But by truthfulness I mean something deeper
than an avoidance of verbal falsehood. I mean
a temper of mind which even a Robinson Crusoe
could achieve. I mean a humility before facts,
a free acceptance of the discipline of Reason,
so that beliefs are accepted or rejected after
an impartial examination of evidence. Truthfulness, in this sense, is a late-comer among the
-virtues. The most ancient civilizations knew
it not, with the ex~eption of Greece. There are
traces of , it in Buddhism, but none in
Christianity. It is the ideal of science, but it is
incompatible with religious revelation.
The practical value of truthfulness may not
be so immediately apparent as the advantages
of ordinary veracity in social intercourse'. It is
sought even now by comparatively few. Yet
it is to those who practise 1fhis intellectual
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austerity that some of the most far-reaching
changes in history are due. Science would be
impossible if men had not learned to suspend
judgment and to make decisions in accordance
with the evidence. And without science what
hope is there of combating disease and maintaining civilized standards of life in a world
which becomes more and more thick(y populated?
I refrain deliberately from saying "overpopulated," because it seems probable that we
already have sufficient technical knowledge to
enable the needs of an even larger population
to be satisfied. If this is. disputed it may at
least be agreed that the surest hope of providing
a sufficiency of necessary goods lies in the correct
application of scientific knowledge.
The fruits of science, ' as we see only too
plainly in the midst of war, can be used to destroy .
life; but they can also be used to enrich it.
Knowledge of physical laws is ~wo-edged;
some other kind of knowledge is needed if
civilization is to be advanced, and it is precisely
this additional information that ethics should
provide. The task of the moralist is to draw
upon the findings of special departmentsbiology, psychology, sociology, and economics~nd lay down general principles of conduct by
which the goodness of an individual and a
society can be measured.
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The good society, from this point of view,
willl?e one in which all men have the opportunity
to satisfy their material needs and to develop
their potentialities to the fullest possible extent,
a society that functions without harmful
contradictions, and so enables its members to
lead freer and fuller lives than would be possible
under an inferior type of organization. To
attain this goal we must not merely desire it,
we must also have a vast amount of technical
knowledge. We must not hypnotize ourselves
with high-sounding phrases: we must know a
great deal about drains and germs and machines,
and we must study the laws of individual
and' group behaviour. We must, in short,
make use of scientific method.
I t is a commentary on the present state of the
world that truthfulness should need to be
defended. To the Victorian Rationalists it
seemed self-evident that scientific inquiry should
be disinterested, and that the progress of mankind was bound up With the success of such
investigation.
Nowadays, however, science is being subjected
to a more powerful attack than has ever come
from religious opponents, not excluding the
Inquisition. In Germany, for example, there
is an organized attempt, backed by the authority of the State, to force science on to the
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Procrustean bed of Nazi ideology. The
" truth" of a scientific theory in Germany is
not determined in the ordinary way by a sifting
of evidence. The theory may be disproved by
looking up the birth certificate of the author.
Einstein and Freud are Jews; therefore, it is
urged in q.u ite responsible quarters, their theories
are false and do not need further examination.
Similarly, the appointments in universities are
governed by political orthodoxy, rather than
by scholastic attainments. An anthropologist
who questions the peculiarly nonsensical views
on race that are put forward by Nazi apologists
will not get a job and is lucky to find himself
outside a concentration camp.
What would happen to science if Fascism
dominated the world? It seems doubtful if it
could grow in such an intellectual climate, for the
advance of science is no longer so dependent on
isolated geniuses. Science is a collective enterprise and requires an elaborate organization and
expensive apparatus. If truthfulness were
extinguished by persecution we might slowly
enter another Dark Age.
The lights have already gone out over a great
part of Europe. But all periods of darkness
hitherto have carried the s~eds of their own
destruction. The Inquisition did not stamp out
science, though it imprisoned Galileo. The
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needs of society, emerging from Feudalism,
demanded science. And so, a fortiori, the
modern wQrld, with its even more difficult
problems, is perhaps not likely to abandon for
long the only means of salvation.
Individuals strive for health, without
necessarily being conscious of the fact. So, too,
communities strain towards more efficient
functioning. On the long view history is a
process of transformation from a less satisfactory
to a more satisfactory order. What appears as
virtue in an individual, in the sense in which I
have been using the word, turns out to be what
enables the community to survive and at the
same time to advance.
Thus the practical moralist is able to extract
values, rather than to impose them, from the
historical process itself. Such values emerge
in the - course of development. Veracity is
essential in the most primitive communities, for
men cannot liye together harmoniously if they
do not speak the truth. Primitive communities,
however, can maintain themselves without
science; but we, to-day, cannot hope to do so.
Consequently truthfulness is a quality that
must spread if we are to preserve the standards
of civilization we possess. That the increase of
truthfulness-which means the closer application of science to all departments of li:fe-
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would improve our standards seems indisputable.
But something else is needed. As we have
seen, man shipwecked on a desert island can
practise truthfulness, which is a mode of
behaviour according to the reality-principle.
Yet he could not cultivate social feeling, or
regard for others.

a

SOCIAL FEELING

Man is a social animal. When we ignore this
fact we indulge in fantasy-thinking. An
anchorite, imm~red in his cell, can lead a perfect
life, according to certain religious teachings.
But from our point of view he is only half alive.
For a man to be a celibate or 'a woman to be
childless is to be only half alive. The neurotic
and the moron, the sensualist, the dry-as-dust
pedant, and the miserly recluse, in their different
ways, are half alive. They neglect to use vital
functions. They do not make the most of
themselves.
In order to make the most of himself a man
requires a suitable environment. It is impossible to lead a full life in a prison or a slum.
To enable the majority of people to make the
most of themselves it is necessary to organize
their relationships so that the essentials of
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life-food, clothing, housing-are available to all.
Technical knowledge can enable us to provide
these essentials, the bare minimum of civilized
life; and it may provide a rational motive for
making social changes, when necessary, since
in the last analysis, we must all sink or swim
~ogether.
If civilization were to founder we
should all be involved in the collapse, and so a
case can 'be made out for acting scientifically on
grounds of prudence.
But all attempts to reduce altruistic behaviour
to conscious self-interest have failed. Something is left out of such an account. Human
beings are not logical calculating-machines.
They have emotions, they have feelings for one
another. The man who makes the most of
himself feels a spontaneous sympathy with
others in distress. It is only the neurotic,
whose generous impulses are atrophied, who can
be indifferent to suffering. Only the selfsatisfied, childishly-vain moron can enjoy a
luxurious meal while hungry faces are pressed
against the window.
, Hence the second general principle underlying our list of psychological virtues-regard
for others. It is not the ,gift of supernatural
grace; on the contrary it is a perfectly natural
feeling in a man whose body and mind interact
healthily. It is so fundamental that we may
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even call it an instinct. The hen will expose
herself to the swooping hawk in order to protect
her young. The wounded gorilla will cover the
retreat of its companion, ignoring self-preservation. The lowest savage exhibits loyalty to the
tribe, courage in defending· his comrades, pity
for suffering. Inasmuch as an individual isolates
himself and loses the sense of solidarity with the
group, he must be regarded as a sick man.
ce In one way," writes Freud,
the neuroses
show a striking and far-reaching correspondence
with the great social productions of art, religion,
and philosophy, while again they seem like
distortions of them. We may say that hysteria
is a caricature of an artistic creation, a
compulsion neurosis a caricature of religion, and
a paranoia delusion a caricature of a philosophic
system. In the last analysis this deviation goes
back to the fact that the neuroses are social
formations; they seek to accomplish by private
means what arises in society through collective
labour. . . . The real world which neurotics
shun is dominated: by the society of human
beings and by the institutions created by them;
the estrangement from reality is at the same
time a withdrawal from human companionship." (Totem and Taboo.)
The case is put more strongly by Adler.
We
can judge a character as bad or good only from
tc

tc
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the standpoint of society," he writes. "The
criteria by which we can measure an individual
are determined by his value to mankind in
general." Again: ,e When we observe the
slow development of a child we may be certain
that no evolution of human life is possible withou~ the presence of a protecting community.
The various obligations of life carry in themselves the necessity for a division of labour which
not only does not separate human beings, but
strengthens- their bonds. Everyone must help
his neighbour. Everyone must feel himself
bound to his fellow-man."
On Adler's view all ethical judgments can be
reduced to statements about social feeling."
This term is not a very adequate translation of
the wor~ Gemeinschaftsgefuhl, which connotes a
sense of human solidarity, a sense of fellowship
in the human community. When that sense is
strong we may say that a man is virtuous.
The divergences between Adler and Freud on
general psychological theory do not concern us.
Both have been led by a scientific study of
behaviour to the opinion that the isolated man
has deviated from the norm of health. "Am
I my brother's keeper? " was the question of
the first individualist. But the alternative to
being an individualist is not to be a robot.
(l
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THE MEANING OF PROGRESS

We began by considering a negation-a
picture of the universe from which the consoling
glow of illusion had died. We saw the gloom
with which this shattering of the old, comforting
faiths infected some minds. But -n ow we have
crossed the Waste-land.
It is not true that " one thing is as good as
another." It is not the case that there is
nothing to choose between health and disease.
It is clear that some kinds of behaviour will
produ~e wretchedness and other kinds happiness.
Equally, some communities work smoothly and
others are full of discords. If we wish men to be
healthy, to be happy, and to be well supplied
with the necessities of life, we are entitled to say
that some kinds of behaviour are better than
others.
'Belief in progress has become unfashionable.
This is no doubt partly due to the disillusion
which followed the 'unfulfilled promise of the
Victorian Age. Wh.ether progress is inevitable
is a metaphysical question, but I do not see how
it can be denied that civilized man can lead a
much fuller life, say, than the Australian
aborigine.
If I were asked to define progress in a single
phrase I should say that it was marked by
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" increase of consciousness." The mind of the
aborigine is emptier than the mind of the
anthropologist who observes him. He is a slave
to custom, and there are no flashes of originality
to relieve the monotony of his mental life. His
physical poverty is matched by the meagreness
of his vocabulary, for he has no word for a
number above three.
He does not think for himself. He accepts
without question the~ iron rule of custom; he
never doubts the .fairy-tales that are handed
down by tradition .
Nazi Gleichschaltung is a step backwards to
the homogeneity of tribal life, to the most ancient
superstitions of blood-kinship, to primitive
group-thinking. If mankind were to take this
road back it would certainly seem as though the
critics of historical progress were justified.. Yet,
even within Germany itself, it looks as though
the forces of oppression are merely strengthening
the forces of recoil. The nature of their success
calls into being 'a n oppositIon thafwill ultimately
destroy it.
" Increase of consciousness" can be obtained
only. by the elimination of those frictions in the
mind that waste energy. It is the fruit of a
balanced, harmonious personality; but, as we
have seen, this fullness of life involves a reference
to the community.. Man cannot lead a full life
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cut off from human fellowship. To engage all
his capacities he must become a useful member
of society. Indeed, by seeking to improve the
society in which he lives, moves, and has his
being, by using his knowledge for the benefit of
others, he changes not only the material environment but the very quality of his own
conSCIousness.
What precise changes are necessary at a given
time is a matter for special investigation and lies
outside the province of ethics. Our concern is
with values. We can ask only very general
questions. We may ask, of individual conduct:
"Does this contribute towards an integrated
personality? Or does it resemble the behaviour
of a neurotic?" And we may ask, of a particular community: (( Does this type of organization work? Does it enable the majority of
people to lead the fullest possible lives? "
The equivalent of cortical control in society is
a type of organization in which the element of
chance is reduced to a minimum. The good life
follows some rational plan, and the good society
will be governed by a plan that reduces, as far as
possible, waste in production and the friction
engendered by conflicting interests. In a
rational society public welfare will be identical
with private gain.
In the ideal of an objective .ethics, the mature

I
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man, the old opposition between the individual
and society is resolved. He will increase his
consciousness by the variety of his interests and
relationships. By uniting truthfulness with
regard for others he will be a good citizen without
becoming a mere cog in a State-machine.
He will be free, because his pursuit of truth,
his humility before facts, will lead him to
recognize necessity, to think realistically. He
will be free also in the sense that he will not need
the guidance of elaborate moral rules. His
temper of mind is a sufficient guarantee that his
instinctive response to a situation will not be
governed by narrow self-interest.
We can go further, for even self-sacrifice has
a place in naturalistic ethics. Social feeling can
be stronger than the desire for personal security.
This is no paradox, for it is a matter of experience
that, although a man's happiness may be found
in the presence of those he loves, he will give his
life, if necessary, in order to protect them.
Happiness is a consequence of the full life, it is
not the final cause. The scientist who risks his
life in the conquest of some deadly disease, the
rebel who faces the armed might of some intoler,ble tyranny, all who scorn security and are
ready to face death if need be for a purpose that
is wider than self-interest, fulfil themselves in
their very endeavour. They seek no future
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reward. "The sense of worth beyond itself,"
writes Dr. Whitehead, " is immediately enjoyed
as an overpowering element in the individual
self-attainment. It is in this way that the
immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed
i~to triumph."

"The best value I know."-John
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